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Water managementa b s t r a c t
Groundwater is one of the most challenging common pool resources to govern, resulting in resource
depletion in many areas. We present an innovative use of collective action games to not only measure
propensity for cooperation, but to improve local understanding of groundwater interrelationships and
stimulate collective governance of groundwater, based on a pilot study in Andhra Pradesh, India. The
games simulate crop choice and consequences for the aquifer. These were followed by a community
debriefing, which provided an entry point for discussing the interconnectedness of groundwater use,
to affect mental models about groundwater. A slightly modified game was played in the same commu-
nities, one year later. Our study finds communication within the game increased the likelihood of groups
reaching sustainable extraction levels in the second year of play, but not the first. Individual payments to
participants based on how they played in the game had no effect on crop choice. Either repeated expe-
rience with the games or the revised structure of the game evoked more cooperation in the second year,
outweighing other factors influencing behavior, such as education, gender, and trust index scores. After
the games were played, a significantly higher proportion of communities adopted water registers and
rules to govern groundwater, compared to other communities in the same NGOwater commons program.
Because groundwater levels are affected by many factors, games alone will not end groundwater deple-
tion. However, games can contribute to social learning about the role of crop choice and collective action,
to motivate behavior change toward more sustainable groundwater extraction.
 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
By their very nature, common pool resources like water,
fisheries, or forests are easily depleted if there is not effective
coordination, because use by one person affects the availability
of resources to others, but it is difficult to exclude or regulate users.
However, extensive research has demonstrated that self-
governance by communities can be very effective for sustainable
management of common pool resources by creating and enforcing
rules about who can appropriate the common resources, as well as
when, where and how (Agrawal, 2001; Anderies and Janssen 2013;
Ostrom, 1990). This is especially important at the local level wherethe state does not have the capacity to set, monitor, and enforce
rules on the use of these resources (Meinzen-Dick, 2014).
Yet effective collective action does not always emerge. If self-
governance can lead to effective and sustainable outcomes, what
can be done to stimulate such solutions? Imposing socially optimal
solutions can lead to perverse outcomes because of concerns about
procedural justice—the fairness of the decision making process
(DeCaro, Janssen, & Lee, 2015) or because they displace (crowd
out) moral sentiments that would otherwise prompt people to
behave less selfishly (Bowles, 2008; Cardenas, Stranlund, &
Willis, 2000). Programs in irrigation and forest management have
used community organizers to catalyze collective action, but this
is expensive and creates dependencies on external programs and
funding (Bruns & Bruns, 2004); in many cases the cooperation is
not sustained after the program ends. Thus, it important to find
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the value of cooperation.
Although water, as a mobile common pool resource, is challeng-
ing to govern, there are many examples of effective collective
action to manage surface water (Tang, 1992; Schlager, Blomquist,
& Tang, 1994). However, groundwater poses additional challenges,
owing to difficulties in observing use and understanding resource
dynamics (Schlager, 2007; Verma, Krishnan, Reddy, & Reddy,
2012). Those with the financial ability to sink wells are able to
use water relatively autonomously, making it difficult to organize
users and control water extraction (Giordano, 2009; Hoogesteger
and Wester, 2015; Wester, Sandoval-Minero, & Hoogesteger,
2011). At the same time, the dispersed nature of water use also
makes it difficult to implement regulations imposed by the state
(López-Gunn & Cortina, 2006). The fact that it is often the wealthier
and more influential farmers who have wells can make it even
more difficult to regulate their use, either through collective action
or state regulations (Hoogesteger & Wester, 2015).1 Consequences
of the failure of governance—by the state or communities–are seen
in rapid groundwater depletion in many countries, including notably
in hard rock areas of India. Community groundwater budgeting pro-
grams show promise in limiting irrigation withdrawals in India, but
such cooperation often ends when the project ends (Garduño et al.,
2009; Wani et al., 2008). As noted by Shah, Burke, and Villholth
(2007:396–397): ‘‘To manage groundwater resources properly and
to identify effective resource management strategies urgently
needed among the poorest agrarian societies, an improved under-
standing of aquifer behavior has to be combined with an apprecia-
tion of the socioeconomic drivers of intensive groundwater use.”
That understanding of aquifer behavior is needed not just by experts,
but by water users themselves, which calls for social learning.
Behavioral experiments have been used extensively to study
factors affecting collective action, including for resource gover-
nance (Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010). Anecdotal observations
suggest that doing experimental games in communities can also
lead to changes in practices (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2005). Some
games have been used for individual learning, but have generally
not been tested for social learning. Framed field experiments pro-
vide opportunities for dialogue with community members regard-
ing collective action, and the exercises and discussions may offer a
safe environment to experience a shared challenge so they can dis-
cuss and ponder the significance of the situation. This may lead to
changes in community members’ views on the valuation and man-
agement of the resource. Studying these effects can indicate
whether such games can become a tool for strengthening collective
action.
This paper presents the use of behavioral games as an instru-
ment for social learning to facilitate self-governance of common
pool resources, based on a pilot study on groundwater governance
in Andhra Pradesh, India. The games contain elements of role play-
ing games (RPGs) (Barreteau, Le Page, & Perez, 2007) and experi-
mental economics (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994; Bousquet
et al., 2003) to create an action situation in which participants have
a salient collective experience, followed by community level dis-
cussion to stimulate co-discovery of new solutions.
We begin with a theoretical review of how behavioral games
can contribute to collective resource management, followed by
an overview of the groundwater situation in Andhra Pradesh and
the potential contribution of the games in improving local under-
standing of groundwater dynamics and rules for its governance.
We then describe the methodology of our study and the results
in terms of factors affecting how people played in the games, the1 However, wealthy individuals may also provide leadership on collective activities.
For a review of the effect of heterogeneity on collective action, see Bardhan (1993);
Jones (2004); Kurian and Dietz (2013) and Vedeld (2000).influence on local mental models, and broader impact of the
games. The discussion and conclusions deal with the potential of
games as a facilitation tool for social learning to affect mental mod-
els of a resource and for strengthening collective resource
governance.2. Theoretical prospects on the use of behavioral experiments
and role playing games
The use of groundwater games has two effects that can explain
the potential beneficial impact. First, humans have difficulty
understanding causal relationships in dynamic systems. Even
highly educated graduate students in engineering fail to correctly
describe the dynamics of simple systems like filling a bathtub
(Booth Sweeney & Sterman, 2000; Cronin, Gonzalez, & Sterman,
2009). Moxnes (2000) found that the lack of understanding of
dynamic systems can explain overharvesting of dynamic resources.
Hence, when communities in rural India get access to powerful
pumps with free electricity, the consequences of the resulting
increased water use on the groundwater level is not evident to
them. Especially in hard-rock areas where the aquifer boundaries
are complex and where the groundwater levels change rapidly
due to monsoon rainfall, we found from discussions in the debrief-
ing and our mental models survey that people’s mental model of
groundwater levels did include rainfall, but not crop choice.
Mental models are peoples’ internal representation of external
reality (Hoffman, Lubell, & Hills, 2014) and are assumed to influ-
ence decision making of resource users (Jones, Ross, Lynam,
Perez & Leitch, 2011). There is increased attention to the role of
mental models in natural resource management, but one of the
key challenges remains the elicitation of those mental models
(Jones et al., 2011). Vuillot et al. (2016) study the relationship
between mental models and the actions of resource users, finding
that differences in farmer practices can be explained partly by dif-
ferences in mental models. The biophysical and social contexts,
including policies, constrain actions of resource users and explain
why they may not make actions in line with their mental models.
As discussed below, the participants in our games have a lim-
ited understanding about the nature of the groundwater problem.
By demonstrating the inter-relationships between crop choice and
water levels, the games may reveal the mismatch between the
mental models and the actual dynamics of the system, and may
improve the understanding of what affects groundwater levels,
and in turn enable the resource users to develop better governance.
The second effect is pedagogical. NGOs have been teaching the
use of water budgets in communities, but the changes have been
limited after the intervention ends (Garduño et al., 2009). This
might be caused by the way information was transmitted. Peda-
gogical research on the effectiveness of teaching has found that
passive dissemination of facts does not stimulate a deep under-
standing of the problem and a life-long learning. Rather, more
active and collaborative learning activities such as educational
games stimulate a deeper understanding of complex educational
material (Lujan and DiCarlo, 2006).
The use of economic experiments in the classroom has been
shown to increase the understanding of economic concepts
(Dickie, 2006; Durham, McKinnon, & Schulman, 2007; Ball, Eckel,
& Rojas, 2006; Frank, 1997). The performance is measured by test
scores compared to control classes who do not use experiments.
Ball et al. (2006) assessed the effectiveness of using the Wireless
Interactive Teaching System (WITS) in economics classes. Experi-
mental class students obtained on average 3.2 points more than
control class students. The experiments had a greater impact on
groups that usually have more difficulties learning economics,
including women and freshmen. The main explanation for these
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imental classes more and as a result, they were more engaged with
the materials and the discussions. Frank (1997) compared the
results of a group of students who participated in a simple class-
room experiment about the use of common-property resources
with the results of a control group of students. The students partic-
ipating in the experiment obtained higher grades than the control
students in a test about the ‘‘tragedy of the commons”.
The way the experiments are implemented has an impact on
the outcome. Cartwright and Stepanova (2012) find that reflection
on the experience with experiments by writing a report increased
the effectiveness. Rousu et al. (2015) show that providing mone-
tary incentives increased the performance in student exams. In a
meta-review of serious games in education, Wouters, van
Nimwegen, van Oostendorp, and van der Spek (2013) found that
learning effects were greatest when games were repeated, supple-
mented with other methods, and players worked in groups. These
studies suggest that effectiveness of the use of experiments, at
least in education, is increased if the educators can create ways
to enhance the engagement of the students.
The hypothesis that experiments can be used as a pedagogical
tool to strengthen collective action in practice was partially
explored for first time in Cardenas and Carpenter (2005). As a
result of many years of field experience with experimental games,
the authors noted that experiments provided participants with
useful metaphors for their daily lives. They analyzed the learning
effect of experimental games in three villages of Colombia by con-
ducting two rounds of experiments, several months apart. One or
two days after the first experiments, a workshop was held in each
community to discuss the strategies that participants followed
during the games as well as other relevant issues related with
the management of common pool resources. The role of the work-
shop in providing cooperation mechanisms and promoting pro-
social behavior was believed to be high. The results of the second
round of experiments suggest that both new and experienced par-
ticipants cooperated more in the second round, although Cardenas
and Carpenter (2005) also acknowledge that a more-systematic
follow-up approach would be needed to obtain more conclusive
results.
The present study provides such systematic testing of the effect
of collective action games on collective action for natural resource
management. Most experimental studies lack a collective debrief-
ing session and can thus contribute to individual learning, but not
social learning. To address this shortcoming, our approach includes
community-level debriefing to discuss the outcomes of the games
and their relevance to the local situation.
There are similarities between the use of such behavioral exper-
iments as a tool for learning and role-playing games (RPGs) used
for natural resource management. Many RPGs involve complex
interactions, where players are asked to take on different roles,
either acting them out or using board games or computer simula-
tions. Shah, Verma and Krishnan (2013) report on the use of a
detailed RPG to simulate groundwater irrigated production
dynamics and possible reform options in India. Although RPGs
are often used as a research tool to understand local ecological
knowledge and strategies or to validate models, they are also
now being used in interventions to improve management of
resources such as irrigation systems, biodiversity, or landscape
planning (Barreteau et al., 2007, Bousquet et al., 2003). Villamor
and Badmos (2015) report on a recent use of an RPG on grazing
management in Ghana, which was replicated across 23 sites, and
found that the game did elicit local goals and understanding of
their situation, but was limited in facilitating social learning.
Dionnet, Kuper, Hammani, and Garin (2008) used RPGs as part of
a participatory process for farmers developing collective drip irri-
gation systems in Morocco, and found that the RPGs could be veryuseful for the learning process, but there is a challenge in identify-
ing the appropriate level of abstraction that allows farmers to con-
sider different options but also relate this to their own real-life
situations (see also Kuper et al., 2009). Although simplified RPGs
and complex behavioral experiments are very similar, the latter
are generally simpler and more generic, with fewer roles or posi-
tions and more predefined outcomes. This makes them easier to
replicate across sites, while leaving space for participants to iden-
tify the links between the games and their own situations, espe-
cially in the context of facilitated community debriefings.
Another difference between RPGs and behavioral experiments
is the use of monetary payments in behavioral experiments as sali-
ent incentives for decision making. The practice in economics is to
provide individual (monetary) rewards so that actions have moti-
vational relevance (Smith, 1982). In RPGs there is no practice of
individual financial incentives. Providing different individual pay-
ments to participants in behavioral experiments as an activity of
NGOs to strengthen collective action is a concern. Differential indi-
vidual payments are in contrast to common practices of the NGOs.
Therefore, we review the practice of individual cash payments in
behavioral experiments.
Does the use of monetary rewards in behavioral experiments
affect the outcomes? Psychologists and economists have done sim-
ilar experiments, but psychologists do not use monetary rewards
and argue that such monetary rewards will not affect the decisions
(Smith and Walker, 1993). Experimental evidence indicates that
payments can have an effect. If participants perceive the rewards
as a fair contribution for the effort, the results will not be affected
by different levels (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Amir, Rand, & Gal,
2012). However, if the monetary reward is very low, this can back-
fire and participants will put in less effort (Gneezy & Rustichini,
2000). Gneezy & Rustichini (2000) found that it could be more
effective to appeal to moral incentives (such as contributing to
an important activity) rather than providing a monetary reward.
If collective action games are to be part of interventions in commu-
nities for resource management, there are legitimate concerns not
only about the cost of making significant enough payments, but
also that individual payments may cause resentment by those
who lose out or are not invited to play. It is therefore important
to test whether payment method affects either performance in
games or the learning from the games.
In sum, the use of games–an activity that includes elements of
role playing games and experimental economics–in communities
has potential to increase their understanding of the relationships
between their actions and groundwater levels, to frame the prob-
lem as a collective action problem, and provide ways to address
the collective action problem.3. Context and potential contribution of groundwater games in
Andhra Pradesh
Over 60% of the irrigation and 85% of domestic water in India
comes from groundwater (World Bank, 2010). As demand for both
water uses grows, it has led to falling water table levels in many
areas. This is particularly the case in the state of Andhra Pradesh,
which has predominantly hard rock aquifers with patchy areas of
groundwater and low storage (World Bank, 2010). Farmers in
Andhra Pradesh have historically depended on canal and tank irri-
gation. While the eastern part of the state, blessed with large rivers
like Krishna and Godavari, depended on canal irrigation, the hin-
terland in the north and south of the state, known as Telengana
and Rayalaseema respectively, depended mostly on tanks for irri-
gation. However, there has been a decrease in state investments
in irrigation (Vaditya, 2017) and a decline in the institutions that
traditionally facilitated tank management (Shah, 2012; Taylor,
Fig. 1. Conceptual model of factors affecting groundwater levels.
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areas of tanks, and a breakdown in traditional systems that
ensured that the catchment areas and feeder channels were main-
tained has resulted in faster siltation of tanks. Coupled with these
factors, the proliferation of intensive cropping techniques involv-
ing heavy of use of chemical inputs and water has meant that
the demand for water outstripped the ability of traditional sources
like tanks and canals to supply, and farmers have increasingly
relied on tubewells.
During the last three decades, the number of wells and the land
under groundwater irrigation in Andhra Pradesh has almost tripled
(Directorate of Groundwater, 2011). In 2008, of the state’s 1227
groundwater blocks (sub-district administrative units), 300 were
at critical or overexploited levels and 208 were at semi-critical
levels (World Bank, 2010).2 In 2014, deep water levels of over 20
meters were reported in 16 percent of the wells in the state as a
whole, and 41 percent of the wells Ananthapur District, our study
area (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2014).
Many factors affect groundwater levels, including natural pro-
cesses, state policies, local rules, and individual choices that affect
the balance of groundwater recharge and extraction (use), as illus-
trated in Fig. 1 (see also Shah et al., 2007). Environmental factors
such as rainfall patterns and the type of substrate determine
groundwater recharge rates. Tank irrigation is an important source
of recharge, but the decline in tank management reduces recharge
(Taylor, 2013). Groundwater recharge can also be improved with
the implementation of watershed management and other partici-
patory programs that focus on enhancing the management of
groundwater and other natural resources (Giordano, 2009; Gray
& Srinidhi, 2013; Kerr, 2007).
On the groundwater use side of the equation, state regulations
can have an effect. There are policies regulating the spacing of
wells in areas designated as over-exploited, but the implementa-
tion of these policies is often weak (Kemper, 2007; Shah,
Giordano, & Mukherji, 2012). State policy on energy can influence
groundwater use, but electricity tariffs in Andhra Pradesh follow a2 In 2014 Andhra Pradesh was divided into two states: Andhra Pradesh and
Telangana. State-level figures in this paper refer to the undivided state. All study areas
are in the portion that remained Andhra Pradesh.flat-rate system under which electricity is either free (for pumpsets
under 10 horsepower) or a small monthly fee per horsepower for
larger pumps, regardless of pumping hours. This encourages ineffi-
cient groundwater pumping practices like the operation of bore-
well pumps with low groundwater levels or leaving pumps
switched-on to get supply when the power activates (World
Bank, 2009).3 Crop prices, which are affected by state policy as well
as market forces, also influence groundwater use via economic
incentives to grow water-consumptive or other types of crops.
Taylor (2013) notes that this is compounded by pressures of debt:
farmers need high returns to repay the credit they have used to
invest in wells and commercial inputs.
Ultimately, groundwater use for irrigation (which is the largest
source of groundwater extraction) hinges on the decisions of mil-
lions of individual farmers. These decisions are certainly affected
by economic pressures and state policies, but can also be influ-
enced by community groundwater rules. But whereas there are
many longstanding customary institutions governing surface
water in Andhra (c.f. Wade, 1994), these are less common for
groundwater irrigation. Part of the reason for this is that surface
irrigation has a history of hundreds of years in this area, and it is
relatively easy to see the water flows. By contrast, groundwater
use has developed rapidly over the last 40 years with the introduc-
tion of motorized pumping. The complex hydrology, especially in
hard rock aquifers, combined with the lack of visibility of ground-
water flows, has limited the emergence of local custom about
groundwater. Furthermore, surface irrigation has required collec-
tive or state investment to build and maintain, whereas groundwa-
ter is tapped through individual investment, so that rules for
sharing the water have not been called for (Giordano, 2009;
Wester et al., 2011).
The challenges of developing institutions for sharing groundwa-
ter are compounded by the power structures around groundwater,
where larger landholders and higher castes own a disproportionate
share of the wells (Taylor, 2013). In Andhra Pradesh large, medium3 Water-saving technologies such as sprinkler and drip irrigation may reduce
pumping, but do not necessarily reduce groundwater overdraft, if the water ‘‘saved”
would have percolated back to the water table, or if farmers would then use the
pumped water to irrigate more area (Giordano, 2009).
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tute about 2% of the total population but have approximately
27% of the tubewells, compared to 97% small and marginal land-
holders with 74% of the tubewells. Similarly, Scheduled Castes
(SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) comprise roughly 28.5% of the total
rural population; but own only about 14% of the total tubewells in
the state.4 Thus, any effort to trigger collective action on groundwa-
ter in AP must contend with the fact that the fruits of exploiting a
shared resource are distributed unevenly owing to power structures,
entrenched in caste and class. The strong economic logic of having to
maximize productivity, juxtaposed with the power structures men-
tioned above, creates strong incentive for farmers across castes
and landholding categories to participate in or increase the exploita-
tion of groundwater. This has resulted in a decline in groundwater
levels, and increased cost of agricultural production. While wealthier
farmers have more resources to deepen their wells and may be able
to out-compete others, in the long term all face increasing costs, and
falling water tables even put domestic water supplies at risk.
There have been a number of programs to stimulate community
groundwater management (see Das & Burke, 2013; Garduño et al.,
2009; Reddy, Reddy, & Rout, 2014). NGOs play a key role as com-
munity mobilizers and facilitators of these programs by raising
awareness among community members about the fragility of the
resource and the importance of cooperating on provision (e.g.
watershed management to enhance recharge) or on expropriation
(e.g. limiting groundwater extraction). NGOs use a variety of tools
to mobilize community and encourage collective action such as
meetings with community members, trainings, Participatory Rural
Appraisal (PRA) tools and focus group discussions. Ideally, as a
result of these meetings, community groundwater budgets and
other sort of rules and agreements are developed among commu-
nity members to regulate groundwater extraction. Even though
the results of these programs have been encouraging in many loca-
tions, not all communities have adopted rules governing ground-
water,5 and the long term sustainability of these programs after
the external support is removed is still a major challenge (Wani
et al., 2008). Thus, the interventions need to lead to community
understanding of groundwater and the role of crop choice and
extraction on groundwater depletion. As Pahl-Wostl et al. (2007,
2008) notes, social learning that bring stakeholders together to
develop capacity and trust needed for collaboration is increasingly
important for water management.
Based on a review of factors affecting collective action in other
aspects of water and natural resource management (e.g. Agrawal,
2001; Bardhan, 1993; Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Poteete
et al., 2010), we can anticipate that biophysical factors such as
water scarcity and road access and characteristics of the users,
including social capital, trust, and reciprocity among community
members may determine whether the community groundwater
budgets and other rules developed by the community are enforced.
Experimental games offer an instrument for better understand-
ing how groundwater users make decisions about groundwater use
and which drivers favor community mobilization and collective
action (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2016). The present study goes beyond
using such framed field experiments as an extractive data collec-
tion exercise for understanding farmers’ decisions, to using them
as an input to NGO facilitation processes, to help farmers under-
stand groundwater dynamics and potentially contribute to the for-
mation and application of rules governing groundwater extraction.4 Distribution of caste and landholding size is from the Census of India (Govern-
ment of India, 2011); distribution of tubewells is taken from the Minor Irrigation
Census (Andhra Pradesh 2007).
5 This is consistent with the findings of López-Gunn and Cortina (2006) in Spain
and Wester et al. (2011) in Mexico, that community self-regulation of groundwater
took hold in some places but not others.Based on the findings of Cartwright and Stepanova (2012) and
Rousu et al. (2015) that engagement with players increases effec-
tiveness of the games in education, the games developed for this
project relate to the critical problems of groundwater depletion,
to raise awareness about the benefits of community cooperation
and sustainable groundwater management. The game focuses on
crop choice, because growing water-consumptive crops has an
important effect on water consumption, and rules governing the
crops grown under groundwater are relatively easy to understand
and monitor. In his review of local management of groundwater,
van Steenbergen (2006) underscores the importance of simple
rules with low transaction in providing the basis for community
action.
Allowing communication during the game can help community
members to realize the importance of establishing norms for a
rational exploitation of the resource. As noted by Ostrom
(2010:1), ‘‘Simply allowing communication, or ‘cheap talk,’ enables
participants to reduce overharvesting and increase joint payoffs
contrary to game theoretical predictions.” The game can change
mental models and improve understanding of the effect of individ-
ual crop choice and well use on collective groundwater levels. It
also delivers the message that the total benefits and costs for the
group are more important than the benefits and costs for the indi-
vidual. To reinforce the social learning, community wide debriefing
sessions after the game discuss the relevance of experimental
game to the challenges the community is facing. The game used
in this study was designed with these factors in mind.4. Methodology
This study was a collaboration between two research organiza-
tions and two NGOs working to improve natural resource manage-
ment in rural Andhra Pradesh. The games were framed field
experiments that simulated crop choice and groundwater levels.
Crop choice was selected as the key decision because it plays a crit-
ical role in net water extraction, and is also readily visible, so local
rules on crop choice are a viable way to limit groundwater extrac-
tion. The games were repeated in the same communities in 2013
and 2014, with modifications of the game, as explained below,
and the NGOs have monitored the communities to note whether
there have been changes in patterns of groundwater use in the
communities where games were played.
For each habitation (local community), the local watershed
association was asked to invite a group of 5 men and a group of
5 women from households using groundwater to participate. Each
group began with 50 units of groundwater, and players were asked
to choose between ‘‘Crop A” which took 1 unit of groundwater and
gave 2 units of money, and ‘‘Crop B” which took 3 units of ground-
water and gave 5 units of money. To stress the mutual impact of
players’ cropping choices and reduce the complexity of the game,
all players were assumed to have equal farm size.
The game was explained to participants using a large graphic
poster and discussion of how these abstract crops related to local
crops with different levels of water consumption and returns
(see Fig. 2 for an English version; the one used was in Telugu). Each
player chose their crop, and showed their choice in private to the
game facilitator. At the end of each round, the total water con-
sumption was announced and shown by lowering the water table
on the graphic. Then a fixed amount of recharge was provided (5
units when the games were played in 2013), and a new water table
level was announced for the start of the second round. After 2–3
practice rounds, this was repeated for up to 10 rounds,6 but if the6 Players were not told how many rounds they would play.
Fig. 2. English version of visual aid used to explain the groundwater game in 2014 and track groundwater levels in the game.
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for full protocol used in 2014).
The game was designed to simulate a real-life collective action
dilemma in crop choice: if all players chose the less water-
consuming crop, the water table would be fully replenished each
round, but if all chose Crop B, the game would be finished after 4
rounds. Thus, Crop B would give higher initial earnings but less
for the total game.7
During the first set of up to 10 rounds, players were asked not to
communicate. This was followed by a discussion of their experi-
ence, and a second set of up to 10 rounds with communication of
up to 1 min per round, followed by individual (secret) crop choice.
Based on experience in 2013, two important modifications to
the game were made in 2014. The first was prompted by observa-
tion that women, on average, were more likely to choose the
water-consumptive crop. This was contrary to expectations,
because women are generally responsible for collecting domestic
water supply, which also depends on groundwater. Qualitative
interviews with women in a subset of the communities confirmed
that women did, indeed, bear the greatest burden when depletion
of groundwater affected availability of domestic water. However,
the framing of the game as exclusively dealing with crop choice
reduced attention to domestic water. To address this issue, in
2014 the game was modified to include domestic water supplies.
In addition to the crop water withdrawals each round, 2 units of
water was deducted for domestic water use, and recharge was
increased to 7 units. When the water table reached 20 units, partic-
ipants were told that the domestic supplies were depleted, and it
would cost every participant 1 unit of money to get replacement
domestic water (however they had played, and whatever the
returns were from agriculture). This is consistent with qualitative
research that found that, because of fluorosis of the groundwater
in many communities, when water tables fell people had to get7 See Meinzen-Dick et al., 2016 and Supplemental Material for the detailed
experiment protocol.water from a neighboring village; even where there was not fluo-
rosis, women would have to go to more distant borewells to ask
for water and carry it home.
The second modification was to add a large sheet of paper on
which the current water level, water withdrawals, and updated
water level were recorded on a table, as illustrated in Appendix
B. Although the changes in groundwater levels were shown by
moving a strip of water down and up the scale on the graphic after
each round, many people found it easier to follow this if it was also
recorded numerically on a table. In effect, this simulated the
records of water table levels from monitoring wells that were pro-
moted as part of the community groundwater management pro-
jects, but which were often not sustained after the projects
ended (see Verma et al., 2012). Because of these modifications,
we cannot say whether changes in game play in 2014 are attribu-
table to repeating the game in the village (not necessarily with the
same players) or to the changes in the structure of the game, but
the team felt that these changes were important to helping com-
munities understand and relate the game to their own experience.
Games were followed by a debriefing session in which the
whole community was invited to participate, either later the same
day or the next day. At the debriefing, the facilitators explained the
game and presented graphs showing overall group results for each
round, by men and women. Those who played the game were
invited to talk about what was going on during the game, and what
they thought of it. This was followed by a discussion of the impli-
cations of the game for the real groundwater situation in their area,
and what might be done about it.
The data from the game, which included a record of each
players’ choices each round and notes on the conversations during
the game, was supplemented with a short questionnaire asked to
each participant covering individual and household characteristics,
agricultural practices, trust-related questions and, in 2014, what
the respondent was thinking about during the game.
Community-level data collection recorded overall infrastructure,
cropping patterns, and trends in groundwater. In the second year
Table 1
Variables used to explain crop choices in the game.
Variable Definition Range Mean
Year Dummy variable indicating second year,
when game was revised: 1 = 2014, 0 = 2013
[0,1] 0.5396
Flat Fee Flat Fee payment {0, 1} 0.460
Communication Communication allowed? {0, 1} 0.501
Available water Quantity of groundwater available at beginning of round,
after recharge
[0, 50] 33.794
Round Round number in game [1, 10] 5.493
Years in program No. of years village had participated in NGO program as of 2013 [6, 20] 11.877
Paved road Village is on a paved road (distance to paved road is 0) [0, 1] 0.515
Female Female participant {0, 1} 0.499
Education Highest education level achieved {0 = none, 1 = adult literacy class, 2 = primary school,
3 = secondary school,
4 = intermediate, 5 = technical school, 6 = university}
2.082
Trust Index Index based on related questions from the individual survey [0, 1] 0.788
Age Participant’s age [20, 86] 39.070
Scheduled Caste/Tribe Is participant a scheduled tribe or caste? {0 = Other Backward Castes or Other Castes,
1 = Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste}
0.166
Area owned Total area of land owned (ha) [0, n] 2.093
9 The independent variables are slightly different than used by Meinzen-Dick et al.
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water irrigators per habitation (total 112 interviews), selected by
the watershed association, who had not played the game, to see
whether there had been any spill-over effects of the games on
the understanding of groundwater dynamics and attitudes toward
groundwater management in the communities where games had
been played, by comparing the treatment sites with results from
mental models interviews in the control sites where no games
were played. We draw on both the quantitative and qualitative
data from the games and mental models interviews, as well as dis-
cussions in the communities and with NGO staff in our analysis in
this paper.
The sampling frame for the games in both years was the 26
habitations where Foundation for Ecological Security (FES) or Jana
Jagriti (JJ) have been working in three mandals (administrative
divisions) of Anantapur District of Andhra Pradesh. The FES sites
were part of a Water Commons program with a village planning
process including participatory rapid appraisal (PRA) techniques
and development of resource maps (see Bruns, 2015). To test
whether the games had any effect on the communities, one third
of the sample was designated as a control, where the games were
not played but only the survey and habitation data were collected,
plus the mental models surveys described below. To test whether
method of payment would affect outcomes of the game, the
remaining two-thirds of the sample was split between sites with
payments to individual game players based on the ‘‘earnings” in
the game (Rs 5 per unit of income earned in all rounds of the
game),8 and sites where a fixed donation of Rs 2000 was given to
the watershed association, but individual players were not paid.
Habitations were allocated between individual payment (Treat-
ment A), community donation (Treatment B), and control (C) using
a stratified systematic sample with a random start. The full set of
habitations were listed by watershed (four where FES is working,
and threewhere Jana Jagriti operates), and thenbynumberof houses
per habitation within each watershed. We drew a random number
between 1 and 3 for the start. That habitation on the list received
treatment A (individual payment), thenwe proceeded down the list
with treatment B (flat fee towatershed association), C (control), and
so on through the list. Stratified samples are relatively efficient for
small sample sizes, and stratifying onwatershedand size of commu-
nity ensures distribution of A, B, andC communities across these key8 Individual earnings could range between Rs 200–500 per participant, which is
higher than the daily wage of Rs 115 for National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(NREGA) projects.variables. The resulting sample had 9 habitations in treatment A and
8 habitats in treatment B. Finally, to test whether the games have
had an effect on community-level rules, we compared sites that
played the game with the full sample of habitations where FES had
been operating the sameWater Commons project community facil-
itation, but did not include the games.5. Factors affecting crop choice in the games
Three broad categories of factors are likely to affect players’
crop choices in the game: those related to the structure of the
game, to the communities, and to the individual players. To assess
their influence, we use a logit model with robust standard errors.
The dependent variable is a binomial variable indicating whether
the participant chose the low water-use crop (Y = 0) or the high
water-use crop (Y = 1).9 Variable definitions, range, and descriptive
statistics are given in Table 1.
Features of the game include the overall structure of the game,
whether communication was allowed, water level at the beginning
of the round, and round number. As noted above, the structure of
the game changed from 2013 to 2014, to include a ‘‘yellow zone”
illustrating depletion of domestic water at 20 units, and a table
to track the crop choice, water use, and water table level. We
would expect all of these changes to reduce water consumption
in the game. However, because the game was changed from one
year to another, these changes are captured by comparison of the
constant in the regressions from 2013 and 2014.10 Communication
(which was only allowed in the second set of 10 rounds) is generally
hypothesized to improve cooperative outcomes, so would be
expected to decrease water consumptive crop choices (Ostrom,
2010; Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008). Available water at the beginning
of the round would likely decrease the need for water saving
(Bardhan, 1993). The Round of the game may also affect choices,
either as players become more familiar with the game and group
dynamics or become fatigued with the game. If individual payment
to participants increases incentives for water consumption, the Flat
fee variable would be expected to have a negative effect on water-
consumptive crop choice.(2016), because of observations from the field on the importance of paved roads for
market access and a more complete set of indicators on cooperation.
10 Note that we cannot distinguish the effect of changing the game structure from
the fact that the game had been played in the community before, although not
necessarily with the same players.
Fig. 3. Average water level at end of each round, 2013 and 2014 groundwater games.
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tive NGO, and location on a paved road. Years in program (in 2013)
is hypothesized to increase cooperative behavior, because of the
influence of the NGOs which have been discussing the importance
of water conservation. Note that FES had been working with its
villages for around 6 years. JJ had been working with its villages
for nearly 20 years. Therefore, this variable also picks up any differ-
ence between the NGOs. Because market access increases the prof-
itability of cash crops, which are often more water consumptive,
Paved road would likely increase choice of water consumptive
crops.
Individual characteristics of the players include gender,
education, age, caste, and land holding. As noted above, we would
expect Female participants to play less water consumptively,
especially with the revised game. Education would be likely to help
participants understand the long-term strategy for the game, and
choose less water consumptive crops.
Trust and social capital are often associated with higher mea-
sures of cooperation and group-oriented behavior (Agrawal,
2001; López-Gunn, 2012). In the context of this groundwater exer-
cise, cooperative behavior is choosing the less water-demanding
crop. To test this, we constructed an individual-level Trust Index
based on a series of survey questions about players’ perceptions
of the honesty and trustworthiness of their neighbors, normalized
to a value between 0 and 1 (See Appendix C). We would expect that
those with higher trust in others would be more likely to cooper-
ate, and hence that the index would be negatively associated with
choosing the water-consumptive crop.
Finally, Age, Caste, and Area owned do not have a hypothesized
direction of effect. All three variables are associated with higher
status, and as noted above, higher caste and larger landholders
are more likely to have tubewells. However, they may either take
more water, or perceive a responsibility for leadership in collective
action.
The average groundwater level at the end of each round in Fig. 3
shows that, early in the game, when water was more abundant,
people were more likely to choose the water-consumptive crop,
but as the game progressed and the water table went down, they
were more conservative and the water table started to plateau.
In 2014 the water table was higher in every round than it was in
2013, which could be attributable to modifications in the design
of the game or prior experience with the game in the villages led
to people choosing less water-consumptive crops.
Table 2 presents the logistic regression results to allow us to
examine the factors affecting crop choice. Communication had asignificant effect on reducing water consumption in 2014, but
not in 2013, which may be related to the design of the game, par-
ticularly the use of a table to help players track the decline of the
water table. We noted that players often referred to the chart to
discuss when they needed to reduce water consumption, especially
where literacy rates were higher. In the debriefing, players noted
that when they played the game without communication, each
person planted the crop according to their own choice, but when
they played with communication, they were able to talk to each
other and plant low water crops. But while most people abided
by the decisions made through discussions, there were a few
who would renege on the promises made and free ride, because
crop choice was still a secret and there were no penalties for break-
ing the agreement. Even with such free riders, in 2014 there was a
more equal distribution of earnings in rounds with communication
than in rounds without.
Available water had a significant and positive effect in 2013 but
not in 2014. The positive association is consistent with
expectations that people would use more of the resource when it
is abundant. The round had a significant negative effect in both
years, as people chose less water-consumptive crops in later
rounds of each game.
The payment scheme within the game does not have a signifi-
cant effect in either year: being paid in cash based on simulated
crop income in the game did not result in any difference in players’
crop choices compared to the sites where the players received only
simulated income, even though in the individual payment sites’
participants were told that they would be paid Rs 5 per unit of
money earned in the game. After we had found no significant dif-
ference in 2013, we followed up on this issue in 2014 with addi-
tional questions in the post-game survey about what participants
were thinking about in the game, as reported on Table 3. When
asked about their goal when playing the game, those who were
being paid based on the outcome of the game were more likely
than those who were not being paid to say they were playing
‘‘for fun”; those not being paid were more likely to say they were
thinking about the (imaginary) money than those who were actu-
ally being paid. Similarly, when asked about how frequently they
thought about money during the game, those who were not being
paid were significantly more likely to report that they were think-
ing about the money, even though it was hypothetical money. The
fact that 70 percent of individual payment and 60 percent of those
who were not paid said that they never thought about money dur-
ing the game might reflect a reluctance to say they were thinking
about money, or that even the individual payments were not
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range from Rs 200–500, which is considerably higher than the
daily agricultural or public works wage rate. Furthermore, when
we asked those who were paid about their satisfaction with the
payment amount, over 80 percent were satisfied or highly satisfied,
so it is not likely that lack of a difference between those paid and
not paid was because the payments were too low. While there
may be some reluctance by those who were paid to admit that they
were thinking of the money, these findings indicate that the game
creates a simulated environment which is equally salient, whether
or not individual players are paid based on outcomes of the game.
The logistic regression results indicate that the number of years
a village has been working with their local NGO—FES or JJ—is
highly significant. Participants in villages that have been working
longer with these NGOs use less water, although this effect was
less in 2014 than in 2013. Participants on a paved road were more
likely to choose Crop B than Crop A in 2013, which is consistent
with the greater potential for commercial crops in those habita-
tions; there was no difference in 2014.Table 2




Available water 0.0350*** 0.0066
Round 0.1242*** 0.1829***
Flat fee 0.0368 0.0969
Years in program 0.0462*** 0.0281***
Paved road 0.2585** 0.1165
Female 0.1789* 0.1154
Education 0.0868*** 0.0330
Trust Index 1.7932** 0.8500
Age 0.0028 0.0000
Scheduled Caste/Tribe 0.0107 0.1944
Land owned 0.0155 0.0015
Constant 0.7917 0.1175
Number of observations 3064 3218
LR chi2(13) 353.61 254.86
Prob > chi2 0 0
Psuedo R2 0.0904 0.0626
Note: ***P < 0.01; **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Significance level derived from robust standard
errors.
Table 3
2014 post-game survey responses on what players were thinking about during the







Goal in the game
For fun 23.96 11.36
To do what I do in
real life
39.02 42.05
To earn as much
money as I can
0.93 6.82
Victory 36.08 39.77
Frequency thinking about money
In every round 11.90 12.05
Many times 1.83 5.02







Very Satisfied 73.46In 2013, when all other variables were controlled, women use
more water than men (p < 0.10). However, there were no signifi-
cant gender differences in 2014, which may be related to the inclu-
sion of domestic water in the game. Because women are primarily
responsible for domestic water supply to the household, making
the explicit link between crop choice and domestic groundwater
supplies seems to have had an effect. Education had a significant
negative effect on choice of the water-consumptive crop in 2013
but not 2014. This may be because even the less educated players
had gained some familiarity with the game, or because the new
game structure was easier for less educated players to understand.
The Trust Index indicator is negative and highly significant for
2013 but not significant for 2014. This indicates that the first time
the game was played, those with higher trust and social connec-
tions were less likely to choose the water-consumptive crop, but
the second year there was higher cooperation overall. Either
repeated experience with the games (in the village, but not neces-
sarily the same players) or the revised structure of the game
evoked more cooperation in 2014, outweighing other factors such
as education, gender, and trust index scores. Age, caste, and land
ownership were not significant in either year.6. Effects of the games
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the first potential contribution of games
is to community understanding. When we developed the games
we had not understood how important this could be: we assumed
that farmers understood the relationships between growing water-
consumptive crops and depletion of groundwater. Therefore, to
test whether the games were affecting community understanding,
in 2014 we attempted to study whether the games were associated
with a change in mental models, by comparing treatment commu-
nities (with games) and control communities (where no games had
been played).
One-on-one interviews about groundwater and domestic water
use were held in all the study sites, treatment villages and controls,
to elicit mental models. The interview consisted of several open-
ended questions and a series of multiple-choice choices, designed
to ascertain what each individual thought about groundwater
dynamics as well as how they used water in their day-to-day lives.
NGO staff noted a prevalent attitude of helplessness in these
communities over their groundwater difficulties. Game partici-
pants, like many other farmers, expressed a common belief that
that they had no control over groundwater levels, because it
depends on rainfall. To address this perception, the community
debriefing meetings were enhanced in 2014 to include a discussion
of trends in groundwater and rainfall in the community, showing
that even when rainfall was normal, the water table continued to
decline. Although everyone’s understanding of hard rock aquifers
is limited (even that of so-called ‘‘technical experts”) the role of
irrigation withdrawals is important to recognize.
Table 4 presents the average responses to questions to elicit
mental models about groundwater, as well as attitudes to regulat-
ing groundwater use. In most of the cases there were no significant
differences between control communities and those that had
played the games. This is not very surprising, given that the inter-
views were conducted a year after the original games, with only
four respondents per habitation, and even those had not been
involved in the games (in order to test for spillover from the games
to others in the community). However, it is encouraging to note
that on three important questions, respondents in the communi-
ties that played the games responded more cooperatively: those
in the game villages were significantly less likely to say that farm-
ers should be able to grow whatever they want, more likely to say
that communities should cooperate to make water available for
Table 4
2014 responses to mental models questions in control villages and where games were played.
Question Control Games Significance
Those with groundwater under their land should be able to make wells and use groundwater 3.893 3.917
Those with land near surface water, such as streams, canals, or tanks, should be able to use water
without any rules limiting their water use
2.607 2.711
Farmers should be able to grow whatever crops they want, without any rules restrictions 4.214 3.357 ***
Communities should cooperate to make sure everyone has access to safe water 4.714 4.476 **
Communities should cooperate to make sure everyone has access to water for agriculture 4.679 4.560
Communities should cooperate to increase rainwater storage in soil, water bodies 4.464 4.417
Communities should make rules about use of groundwater, such as about well location 3.893 4.321 *
Do water harvesting structures increase water in wells? (not at all = 1; a lot = 4) 3.893 3.833
Does taking water from one well affect others? (not at all = 1; a lot = 4) 4.000 3.880
Note: Unless otherwise noted, all variables are on a Likert scale, with Strongly agree = 5, Strongly disagree = 1; ***P < 0.01; **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
11 Note that rules for governing groundwater and water registers are not mutually
exclusive.
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rules about use of groundwater.
Participating NGO staff found that the games are an effective
way to work with rural communities on the issue of groundwater.
Both facilitators and community members enjoyed the games,
which created a different dynamic than conventional meetings or
PRA exercises. Instead of facilitators trying to give the participants
information about groundwater conservation or trying to elicit
their existing practices regarding groundwater use or conservation,
games offer a way of ‘learning while doing.’
Even where players were not paid based on their performance
in the game, participants showed a high degree of engagement.
People immediately assigned real crop names instead of Crop A
and B—usually ragi (finger millet), vegetables, red gram and other
millets for Crop A and sugar cane and paddy for Crop B. In the
rounds with communication, there were often detailed discussions
that provided valuable insights into peoples’ perceptions and
understanding of their interface with groundwater. The discus-
sions that took place before a decision to plant a particular crop,
even in a highly controlled game with only two options, illustrated
the complex of factors that farmers took into consideration in mak-
ing that decision. In particular, the high sunk costs of farmers who
have sunk borewells puts pressure on them to grow high-value
crops to repay the costs, and a decline in tank irrigation has
prompted many to grow paddy—a culturally important but
water-intensive crop–under groundwater irrigation.
The discussions also challenge assumptions about the impossi-
bility of cooperation on groundwater. In addition to concerns for
personal food security and income, players acknowledged other’s
needs for income and—especially as the water tables dropped near
critical levels—concerns to maintain the water levels. When the
water table started falling and players realized they could stabilize
the water table by all taking Crop A, but not replenish it, players in
12 villages took the initiative to ask if they could choose ‘‘no crop”
and draw no water but get no income for a round, so that the fixed
recharge would exceed withdrawals for that round. Although this
was not in the instructions, if players requested it, we allowed it.
This option was chosen more often by women than by men (3 vs
1.7 percent of rounds in 2013 and 2014).
A number of farmers also expressed the importance of talking
among themselves while making choices about groundwater. They
indicated that the rounds played with communication helped them
in better gauging each other’s concerns, which in turn helped in
conserving scarce water resources. However, the effects of commu-
nication were limited by the lack of sanctions. Quite a few players
pointed out that efforts to conserve groundwater cannot work even
if one out of the five players did not stick to the decisions made by
the group. The process of discussing and finalizing a crop to sow
surfaced the collective action dilemma; that those who did not
stick to the collective decision made good money while those
who did ended up losing out. Although sanctions were notincluded in this version of the game, the fact that players identified
this gap provided the opportunity for the debriefing sessions to fol-
low up on the possibilities of sanctions.
Community members themselves articulated the challenges of
reconciling long term ecological considerations with short term
livelihood concerns, and the games allowed them to discuss differ-
ent mechanisms to find an appropriate middle ground. At least in
some of the habitations where the games were conducted, this
helped in triggering discussions about the linkages between agri-
cultural practices and the status of groundwater, and about what
steps that could be taken in order to slow down the decline.
Overall, the games and debriefing offer a useful tool to chal-
lenge dominant narratives about the inevitability of falling ground-
water. During the discussions that ensued in the games and
debriefing, the field teams were able to question the understanding
that groundwater levels are only dependent on rainfall. Greater
recognition of the importance of water withdrawals could pave
the way for the identification of interventions to improve ground-
water outcomes. While the structure of the game did not explicitly
address power structures of caste and landholding, the fact that
neither of these variables affected players’ choices in the game
indicates that the games may provide a context in which commu-
nity members can discuss across these common barriers.
Ultimately, the test of whether these games and debriefing con-
tribute to improving the sustainability of groundwater will be
whether new rules and processes are adopted in the treatment
communities, as illustrated the theory of change in Fig. 1. The indi-
cations to date are that the games are having an effect. Follow-up
observations by FES noted that the habitations where games were
played show a greater inclination to adopt rules and procedures for
governing water resources. Of the 12 habitations where games
were played, six adopted some rules for governing groundwater,
and eight adopted water registers to inventory the water resources
in the village.11 On the other hand, out of the 4 habitations in the
control group where games were not played, only one adopted water
rules or water registers. The rules related to construction of water
harvesting structures that allow for water percolation; equitable dis-
tribution of water; and effective demand side management like the
use of crop water budgeting. Water registers, which are village level
records of the area, storage capacity, and the purpose of each public
and private water resources in the given village, are expected to
prove useful for government agencies, community member and
other interested parties to understand the condition of different
water resources in a village and formulate plans for their restoration
and governance.
The sample comparing games and control sites is not large
enough to generalize from, but we are able to draw comparisons
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Anantapur District. The 16 FES habitations (games plus control
sites) were part of a Water Commons project that FES has been
implementing in 90 habitations since 2011. The same basic FES
activities have been carried out in all of these sites. These include
soil and water conservation measures like constructing water
recharge structures; working with communities to promulgate
habitation and inter-habitation level institutions for governing
water resources, including groundwater; and working closely with
farmers and other rural households to achieve effective demand-
side management, among others. Games and the concomitant
post-game surveys and debriefing were the additional activities
undertaken in the 12 games sites. Only habitation level surveys
were administered in the four control habitations under the games
initiative. Half (6 out of 12) of the habitations where games were
played adopted rules for governing groundwater, compared to
one third (26 out of 78) of the total set where games were not
played. Similarly, 67% (8 out of 12) of the habitations that played
games adopted water registers, as opposed to 36% (28 out of 78)
where games were not played. The substantially higher adoption
of rules and water registers in the sites with games are statistically
significant (P < 0.001), supporting the notion that games have an
effect on community-level rules.12 We have considered using tablets computers, but these often attract attention to
the tool, and distract from the interaction among players. Full guidelines on playing
the game are available on http://gamesforsustainability.org/practitioners/.
13 The sixes were blocked out so that rolling a 6 provided 0 recharge; hence the
possible recharge ranged from 0 to 10.7. Taking games forward
While games have become an integral part of FES’ engagement
with rural communities, especially on issues related to groundwa-
ter, a major challenge confronting the practitioner has been to
transform the game from a systematic tool for observing partici-
pants’ behavior and collecting relevant data, to a heuristic tool that
is simple enough to be implemented and understood even by peo-
ple who are not trained in economics or game theory. It is equally
important that the game can be easily administered within the
time and resource constraints a practicing NGO typically faces.
With these practical realities, various changes have been made to
the basic game that was played as part of this research. Games pro-
vide FES with a tool to engage with the community in an entertain-
ing, engaging manner, which in turn triggers a process whereby
the community and the organization learn and move towards solu-
tions together.
Before looking at the various ways in which groundwater games
have been adapted as a heuristic tool, we have enumerated some of
the limitations to the games that we conducted, that are being
taken into account while planning future exercises intended to
influence mental models and collective action. These limitations
relate to time, scope, tangibility, and predictability.
Time pressure was one of the biggest limitations. In 2013 it was
particularly noted that it was difficult to keep women at the games
for a long time, given the other demands on their time. In 2014
greater efforts were made to find a time that was more convenient
for the women’s groups, but considerable distances to the field
sites and a tight schedule also meant that it was not possible to
undertake iterative visits to a given habitation. Even though the
activities that were a part of the games were spread over an entire
day, the games plus post-game surveys and discussion with com-
munities on a wide range of aspects pertaining to groundwater
proved to be excessively demanding. Being able to do repeated vis-
its to find appropriate times for the games and follow up on the
debriefing could have a greater impact. In addition to time in the
field, sufficient time is also needed for preparation, planning and
training of the field staff. The latter is important to get the appro-
priate game dynamics, in which the facilitators make the abstract
aspects of the game understandable, but let the participants come
up with their own answers and ideas. Time constraints also promptus to limit the complexity of the game and number of variations,
which make the games go longer.
Scope: As useful as they are, games alone are not enough to trig-
ger collective action around groundwater. That requires an
enabling environment wherein the legitimate economic concerns
of the farmers are addressed. This in turn calls for the games to
be nested within a larger set of interventions, including tracing
the history of water tables and cropping patterns in the area, and
providing information on water consumption and returns of differ-
ent crops so that the community can decide on new cropping pat-
terns. The games are limited in scope to use of groundwater among
the small fraction of farmers who currently have access to wells.
While the introduction of domestic water did introduce some of
the broader distribution issues, it still does not address how cur-
rently rainfed farmers might get access to groundwater to increase
their productivity. To partially address this, instead of excluding all
but the five players, FES now welcomes others to observe the
game. If one player has to leave, others can rotate in, to broaden
the participation and potential impact of the game.
The games as presently designed also simulate an unrealistic
situation in which all farmers have equal endowments. In practice,
farmers have different farm sizes, well capacity, dependence on
irrigation, wealth, and power. As noted above, this heterogeneity
of assets and interests can increase or decrease the likelihood of
collective action. The effects of such differences can be included
in the game by assigning different farm sizes and impact on the
aquifer. We did not find a difference in the simulated choices of
participants who have large or small farms in reality. However, it
would be useful to carefully observe whether large farmers and
local elites take the lead in arguing for water savings during the
discussions in the games or community debriefing.
Tangibility: We ran the games using paper score sheets and
abstract crops A and B. This is consistent with experimental games
in university labs and most framed field experiments. But for social
learning, more tangible ‘‘game pieces” are helpful, especially in
areas with low literacy. Thus, FES has adapted the game to use
cards illustrating real crops with low and high water consumption
and play money.12
Predictability: The versions of the games presented here are
quite linear and predictable; the fixed amount of recharge at the
beginning of every round meant that the players could work out
where they would be several rounds ahead, and they could guess
that the games would go on for 10–12 rounds, rather than indefi-
nitely. This contrasts to the long time horizons and fluctuations of
rainfall and water availability in practice.
Further iterations of the game in other sites have introduced
variable recharge by rolling dice before each season to determine
the recharge.13 It is also possible to allow (or guide) communities
to introduce new rules, such as making public crop choices and sanc-
tions for those who break the agreements. FES is now testing out the
‘‘co-creation” of games with communities, asking them what they
would like to try out, and discussing the applicability of each change
to their own situation, e.g. by asking how realistic it would be to
have everyone’s rabi crop choice made public, or what it would take
to be able to sanction those who break the agreements, to trigger
discussions among communities regarding collective action around
groundwater. FES has also been reaching out to introduce the games
to other government and non-government agencies who are con-
cerned with the conservation of groundwater.
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is sometimes a challenge for the facilitating team to refrain from
‘‘teaching” participants what are considered key lessons related
to resource dynamics and importance of cooperation, and to let
them discover and internalize the lessons themselves. Another
major challenge for the facilitating team is ‘active listening’ during
the discussions in the rounds with communication. It is important
to document and analyze the concerns that participants raise, and
address them in the debriefing.
In addition to the ways mentioned above to make the games
more practitioner- oriented, theNGOhas also started nesting games
within larger program interventions. For instance, recently, in select
villages in Chittoor district of Andhra Pradesh, games were com-
bined with crop water budgeting. While the former underlined the
importance of having rules for appropriation and monitoring of
groundwater use; the latter provided guidance for judicious, well-
planned, appropriation of this scarce resource. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that combining the game with other interventions has
the potential to convince the farmers of the need to govern ground-
water better: 19 farmers in Chittoor agreed to grow low-water crops
like fingermillet on part of their land. FES is exploring other avenues
to make games an integral part of their interventions to trigger bet-
ter governance of a scarce and complex resource like groundwater.8. Conclusions
In this paper we reported on a pilot study to investigate the
impact of behavioral games on communities to manage their
shared resources and as such evaluate the possibility of using
games as an intervention tool. Our approach is rooted in the notion
that if groups can self-govern their shared resources, they can craft
effective institutional arrangements tailored to their social and bio-
physical context. The use of games can create a relatively safe
space for social learning by discussing governance options and
experimenting with alternative arrangements.
Based on fieldwork performed in 2013 and 2014 in which we
did the games in 17 communities, we evaluated various types of
impact of performing those interventions. We consistently found
that the use of individual monetary incentives does not affect the
behavior of participants in the games. Surveys performed in the
second round of games confirm that participants take the conse-
quences of their decisions seriously, even if there is no monetary
stake. This finding is important since the use of individual pay-
ments is not desired by NGOs given the potential impact this
may have in communities (inequality in payments).
The games are notmeant to teach communities to adopt a certain
solution. As such it is difficult to evaluate the impact of the games (if
we would teach a solution, we could check whether this solution is
implemented). However, qualitative assessments by the imple-
menting NGOs and community participants indicated that the
gameswere an effective supplement to ongoing community facilita-
tion processes. Together with the community debriefing sessions,
the games contribute to social learning. We also found that the use
of games in the community a year before had measurable impact
on the understanding of groundwater related decision making
within the community, not just the participants of the games. This
indicates that the games leave a ‘‘footprint” in the communities.
Communities where games were played were significantly
more likely to adopt water registers and craft rules for governance
of groundwater compared to those communities where games
were not played, even though the NGO has applied the same set
of other activities in both these categories of habitations. While
it would be overstating the case to say games alone were respon-
sible for this development, the games seem to be playing a con-
tributing role, alongside various other factors, in catalyzingcommunities’ move towards better governance of groundwater.
We plan to follow up on the treatment vs control communities
to see whether the former will also implement these rules and
change their behavior regarding groundwater.
As noted in the literature review and in Fig. 1, the games can play
a limited role in the overall factors affecting groundwater levels.
Rainfall and recharge have a major impact, so efforts to manage
recharge remain important. State policies onwell spacing could con-
tribute to demand management if they were effectively imple-
mented. Energy and crop pricing policy also have a major role in
shaping demand for groundwater. Farmers will not switch to
water-saving crops if none are economically viable, particularly in
the context of high costs and indebtedness of farmers (Taylor,
2013). Evenwithin community facilitation techniques, games alone
are not sufficient: they need to be accompanied by examination of
local trends in groundwater and cropping patterns, and information
about the water requirements, agronomic, and market information
on alternative crops. This is consistent with the finding that even
in classrooms, learning effects are greater when games are not an
isolated activity, but are supplemented with other methods and
repeated to reinforce group-based learning (Wouters et al., 2013).
The conclusion of this pilot study is that the use of resource
games shouldbe consideredbypractitioners as a low-cost participa-
tory tool which could be applied—in conjunction with other mea-
sures–to strengthen collective action for shared resources.
Originally, framed field experiments have provided key insights on
factors that contribute to cooperation; this study indicates that they
can also provide a promising tool to stimulate social learning and
collective action to improve water governance. Further adaptations
of the game, including randomizing recharge and allowing more
crop choices, are being explored to help communities explore alter-
native ways to limit groundwater extraction to sustainable levels.
Other games may also simulate—and stimulate—improved gover-
nance of surface irrigation systems or other natural resources.Conflict of interest
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